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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE RULE OF LAW, DEMOCRACY, AND OBEDIENCE TO LAW

COLLEEN MURPHY*
In The Rule of Law in the Real World, Paul Gowder engages three audiences:
philosophers interested in the concept and normative value of the rule of law,
political scientists interested in measuring and empirically assessing the degree
to which societies meet its demands, and development scholars aiming to
cultivate the rule of law in contexts where it is currently absent or minimally
present. 1 Gowder covers an impressive range of materials from across
disciplines, and his synthesis of different strands of thought about the rule of law
is brilliant.
Gowder defends a version of the rule of law that consists in three basic
principles: a principle of regularity (which requires officials in their conduct and
action to adhere to a reasonable conception of what declared legal rules permit
and prohibit, especially in the coercive use of state power); publicity (which
requires that legal rules be made known to legal subjects in advance, be justified
or justifiable to them, and be open to contestation by those subject to coercion). 2
These first two principles constitute the weak version of the rule of law and
provide safeguards against two kinds of threats: hubris (in which officials act
coercively toward subjects without offering any reason for the basis of their
actions, and in this way treat legal subjects as their inferiors not warranting any
explanation); and terror (where the conditions under which officials’ use of
coercion is not made known to citizens in advance and so subjects are not put in
a position where they can reliably determine what actions to take to avoid
coercion). 3 These two conditions, Gowder argues, are mutually reinforcing. 4
This minimal version does not place demands on the substantive content of law;
it does not entail respect for rights and it is compatible with unjust articulations
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1. PAUL GOWDER, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE REAL WORLD 4 (2016). The second criticism
was published in my review of Gowder’s book for the Tulsa Law Review. Colleen Murphy, The
Rule of Law and Obedience to Law, 53 TULSA L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
2. GOWDER, supra note 1, at 7.
3. Id. at 8.
4. Id. at 7.
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of the conditions under which coercion will be exercised. The third condition,
which transforms the rule of law from its weak to strong version is a principle
of generality (which requires laws to treat legal subjects equally, or as equals);
Gowder specifies the demand of generality as a demand to satisfy the constraints
of public reason. 5 The explanation of the purpose of a particular regulation must
appeal to reasons that can be reasons for those asked to obey, legislators, as well
as the broader community. 6 Such reasons cannot hinge on the subordinate status
of some relative to others to explain why a given rule obtains. 7 Together, these
principles constitute the rule of law as an egalitarian ideal, structuring
relationships of vertical equality (between legal subjects and officials) and
horizontal equality (among citizens). 8
After articulating these three principles, which he notes can be met to
different degrees and which do not require any specific institutional
arrangement, Gowder goes on to show how ancient Athens and contemporary
Britain fared according to the criteria articulated above. 9 He then considers the
conditions under which the rule of law will be stable and under which it can be
cultivated in contexts where it is absent. 10 Stability turns on equality in
Gowder’s view; to the extent that a legal system satisfies the generality condition
it is stable in part because of the commitment to the rule of law this generates. 11
Generating the rule of law is also a function of generating commitment to law
as the way in which interaction between citizens and officials and among citizens
will be structured, as well as fostering control of the use of force by the state
among other conditions. 12
Like all theories, Gowder’s account has a certain set of starting points and
basic assumptions that orient his theory. I focus on two in particular: (a) framing
the principle of generality as an egalitarian principle; (b) rejecting the claim that
the rule of law requires obedience on the part of citizens.
I. GENERALITY AS AN EGALITARIAN PRINCIPLE
Gowder begins chapter two with the following statement: “It is widely
accepted among rule of law scholars, as well as lawyers and philosophers at
large, that the law must be general—that it must treat all in the community
equally, or as equals.” 13 Gowder then sets for himself the task of explaining what
understanding of generality we should adopt. An adequate understanding,
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 11.
GOWDER, supra note 1, at 11.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 31, 76.
GOWDER, supra note 1, at 73, 75.
Id. at 28.
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Gowder claims, will be such that it helps us specify what it means for law to
treat all in the community equally. 14 Before defending his considered
conception, Gowder notes that some theorists do dissent with the thought that
generality is an egalitarian principle, citing Joseph Raz specifically. 15 Raz,
Gowder writes, rejects the idea that generality has anything to do with equality
and claims that the rule of law is compatible with discrimination. 16 But, despite
this caveat, Gowder states that his assumption that generality is an egalitarian
principle “is neither novel nor controversial.” 17
My first point is that defining generality as an egalitarian principle requires
a more robust defense. It is controversial not simply because leading theorists of
the rule of law, Raz as well as Lon Fuller, flat out reject the claim that serves as
Gowder’s starting point (though this by itself should warrant at least some words
of defense on Gowder’s part). 18 It is also controversial because it is at odds with
a basic intuition about the rule of law held by many (one might even say most)
people. This is the intuition that the rule of law is compatible with profound
injustice, particularly in the form of discrimination and gross inequality.
When numerous scholars—and ordinary citizens—think of Nazi Germany,
apartheid South Africa, and the Jim Crow South in the United States, these
societies are frequently characterized as ones in which regimes pursued gross
injustice while respecting the rule of law. No one challenges the inegalitarian
structure of these legal systems. The starting point is precisely the reverse:
recognition of the profoundly inegalitarian character of such systems. Such cases
are seen as challenging the strength of the moral value of the rule of law precisely
because they are cases in which the rule of law is taken to have been satisfied by
flagrantly discriminatory and unjust legal regimes. Governing by law does not
guarantee that the law will be good law. And, so the thinking goes, this is true
regardless of how robustly the requirements of the rule of law are satisfied. Put
differently, Gowder’s starting point is the assertion that the rule of law cannot
be inegalitarian, 19 when it is precisely the intuition that the rule of law can be
profoundly inegalitarian which troubles those who view apartheid South Africa
and Jim Crow United States as paradigm cases of respect for the rule of law that
was grossly unjust. From personal experience, I can say with confidence that
this conviction is both widely shared and runs very deep. I have argued against
it, but making the argument (on the basis of grounds that are different than

14. Id. at 29–30.
15. Id. at 2.
16. Id. at 29, 74.
17. GOWDER, supra note 1, at 28.
18. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 46–49 (3rd prtg. 1967); GOWDER, supra note 1,
at 75–77.
19. See GOWDER, supra note 1, at 58.
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Gowder’s grounds) was a case to be made and a case that was almost always
met with (deep) skepticism. 20
In addition to contesting the egalitarian character of the rule of law
generally, there is reason to question Gowder’s egalitarian interpretation of the
generality requirement. Gowder simply stipulates that if the generality
requirement of the rule of law rules out anything, it rules out the rules
constitutive of apartheid or Jim Crow. 21 In his words, if any principle is not
general, “Black people must sit at the back of the bus” is. 22 But this move, too,
is controversial. There is nothing incoherent—at least conceptually—about rules
that are general but in a discriminatory way. Good laws are not discriminatory,
but it seems on the face possible that a system of law may be general but in a
discriminatory manner. Indeed, scholars like Fuller explicitly reject the demand
that generality requires equality. 23 Fuller writes,
The first desideratum of a system for subjecting human conduct to the
governance of rules is an obvious one: there must be rules. This may be stated
as the requirement of generality. . . . the desideratum of generality is sometimes
interpreted to mean that the law must act impersonally, that its rules must apply
to general classes and should contain no proper names. . . . But the principle
protected by these provisions is a principle of fairness, which, in terms of the
analysis presented here, belongs to the external morality of the law. This
principle is different from the demand of the law’s internal morality that, at the
very minimum, there must be rules of some kind, however fair or unfair they
may be. 24

My final point on the relationship between the rule of law and equality
concerns the relationship between the rule of law and democracy. The principle
of generality, as Gowder defines it, is, I will suggest, incompatible with nonliberal democratic regimes conceptually and not just empirically. The principle
of generality Gowder endorses requires us to examine the expressive function of
laws and consider whether they could be publicly justified to the community,
the legislator, and the particular individual being asked to submit to a particular
rule. At various points, Gowder mentions the compatibility of his account of the
rule of law (even in its strong version) with different types of regimes, including
theocratic monarchies. 25 I am skeptical that this case can be made.
Consider first the cluster of rules specifying the basis on which one assumes
control of decision-making in a political community. What mode of governance
20.
Colleen
(2005).
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See Colleen Murphy, A MORAL THEORY OF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION 41–42 (2010);
Murphy, Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of the Rule of Law, 24 LAW & PHIL. 239, 251
GOWDER, supra note 1, at 42, 210.
Id. at 32.
FULLER, supra note 18, at 46–47.
Id.
GOWDER, supra note 1, at 148–49.
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can be justified to those who will be governed under it that is compatible with
recognition of the equal status of all? Gowder conjectures that in a religious
community power being given to the clergy may not be experienced as insulting
to those who are under its rules. 26 However, the salient question is not whether
it could be empirically experienced this way. Rather, the question is what kind
of reason could be offered for excluding non-clergy from political decisionmaking that would be compatible with recognizing the equal status of all
citizens? Any justification would appeal to the greater theological knowledge or
wisdom or tradition of members of the clergy or perhaps their special standing
within a community. But this seems to say that citizens are not the equal of
clergy in a community, and non-equal for reasons that seem arbitrary for
purposes of political decision-making. By contrast, democracy is a form of
decision-making, as Thomas Christiano notes, minimally predicated on equality
at key moments of collective decision-making. 27 The normative core of
democracy is that all individuals have a right to have a say—and an equal say—
in how they are governed, by whom they are governed. 28 Public justification
seems straightforward.
Similarly, when it comes to key rights associated with liberal democracies
(e.g., rights to bodily integrity, rights to political participation, rights to speech
and assembly), inclusion of recognition and protection of such rights seems
necessary for law to be general in the sense of respecting the equal status of all.
Human rights are widely taken to be constitutive of recognizing the dignity of
human beings, and reflect the basic claims and entitlements that individuals can
make on others. For what possible public reasons could be offered in defense of
the failure to recognize such rights?
What I am suggesting, then, is that the question of the relationship between
the rule of law and liberal democracy is not only an empirical question to be
asked and answered by investigation of actual societies. Rather, if the strong
version of the rule of law entails generality as an egalitarian principle requiring
the justification of laws on the basis of public reasons acceptable to all, the rule
of law demands democracy and robust protection of human rights. This
conclusion should give us pause. An underlying worry about the strong version
of the rule of law is a suspicion that Gowder has conflated the rule of law with
the rule of good law, building more into what it takes to have, strictly speaking,
law govern. And the urge to establish conditions under which it is not only law
that rules, but law that is good, overlooks resources available to critique practices
and rules without the cost of conflating the rule of law as one ideal among many
which societies should strive to achieve.

26. Id. at 158–59.
27. Thomas Christiano, Democracy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jul. 27, 2006), http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/democracy/ [https://perma.cc/43DZ-H9KD].
28. Thomas Christiano, The Authority of Democracy, 12 J. POL. PHIL. 266, 274 (2004).
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II. OBEDIENCE TO LAW
A consistent commitment of Gowder is that the demands of the rule of law
are demands on officials or those individuals or groups who exercise state-like
power. 29 His hesitancy to include any obligation of obedience on the part of
citizens is based in part on his understanding of the source of the problem to
which the rule of law is a solution. 30 The law, in Gowder’s view, is a safeguard
against tyranny and the tyrannical use of the power of the state to oppress and
unjustly use violence against those subject to its power. 31 This is why the rule of
law constrains officials in their exercise of power.
Moreover, demanding that citizens obey the law risks putting citizens in a
position where they are being asked to submit to their own oppression rather
than putting them in a position to contest state power and its abuse. This
implication would potentially undermine the notion that the rule of law is a
moral good. As Gowder writes,
If the rule of law requires ordinary citizens to obey the laws, it would
require—or at least offer some defeasible reason in favor of—citizens to obey
even such evil laws. In doing so, it would perpetrate injustice, and might in fact
bring it about that partial satisfaction of the rule of law is worse than no
satisfaction of it. While this may simply be a moral truth—perhaps the rule of
law has the potential for great wickedness in its partial implementation . . . in
view of the fact that we ordinarily think that the rule of law is a moral good, it is
worthwhile to strive to find a version of the concept that does not have these
objectionable properties. 32

However, Gowder’s concerns seem to rely on an overly simplistic view of how
we should conceptualize any requirement of obedience on the part of citizens.
There is room in any analysis of an obligation to obey the law for that obligation
to be conditional in nature. One may have an obligation to obey the law,
conditional in part on what government officials do. To the extent that
government officials fail in their obligations to adhere to the requirements of the
rule of law, they undermine the conditions on which any obligation of obedience
on the part of citizens depends. As Fuller, who defends the claim that there is an
obligation to obey the law, notes,
[T]here is a kind of reciprocity between government and the citizen with respect
to the observance of rules. Government says to the citizen in effect, “These are
the rules we expect you to follow. If you follow them, you have our assurance
that they are the rules that will be applied to your conduct.” When this bond of

29.
30.
31.
32.

GOWDER, supra note 1, at 55.
Id.
Id. at 55, 146.
Id. at 52.
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reciprocity is finally and completely ruptured by government, nothing is left on
which to ground the citizen’s duty to observe the rules. 33

One of the places Gowder defends the claim that obedience to law on the
part of citizens is not what the rule of law requires is in his discussion of lynching
in the United States. 34 He references the case of Willie James Howard, whose
killers were never prosecuted and whose grave went unmarked. 35 His case, like
others, Gowder claims, tells us about the “instrumental complicity of state
authorities in private racial terror,” allowing whites to take individuals from jail,
impeding chances of prosecution for those implicated in lynching, and
participating in lynching in certain cases. 36 Officials were instrumentally
complicit in the sense that “at those rare moments where local officials actually
tried to put a stop to the lynchings, they largely succeeded.” 37 He concludes,
“The rule of law is a condition to be established by and through the state, and by
limiting the rule of law to a critique of the state’s behavior, we enable ourselves
to see what the state did distinctively wrong in handling the lynchings: it
withdrew its protections unequally from black citizens.” 38
In my view, the picture Gowder describes of lynchings overstates the
independence of the power of the state from citizens, and, relatedly, it ignores
the importance of the willingness of citizens to obey the law for the rule of law
itself. To see its misleading character, let me consider another case, that of Sam
Hose, a twenty-one-year-old Georgian who was lynched in 1899. 39 Sam Hose
was lynched for killing his white employer, Alfred Crawford, and allegedly
raping his wife, Mattie, in their home after an altercation. 40 Following the
murder and alleged rape, Hose fled the town of Palmetto. 41 Local newspapers
ran stories about the murder and rape, writing also that when Hose was caught
he would be killed or burned at the stake and that law enforcement should not
interfere with “the people’s will” by protecting Hose from the lynch mob. 42
Given the gravity of the case, articles stated, the people could not be expected to
wait until law enforcement and the courts weighed in. 43 Along with this
narrative, Hose was described in newspapers and details of a substantial
financial award were published; the award was compiled by contributions from

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

FULLER, supra note 18, at 39–40 (footnote omitted).
GOWDER, supra note 1, at 55.
Id. at 54.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 55.
PHILIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE LYNCHING OF BLACK
AMERICA 3–4 (2002).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 4, 9.
42. Id. at 5.
43. Id.
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newspapers and wealthy businessmen as well as the governor for Hose’s
capture. 44 As in the case Gowder considers, police failed in their investigation,
not going to the crime scene to gather evidence and only talking to the close
friends and family of Crawford. 45
What matters for my purposes is the manner in which Hose was eventually
captured and what transpired between his capture and brutal death. Hose had
fled to his mother’s home, seventy-five miles away from the town of the
murder. 46 Eventually, the owners of the farm on which his mother stayed,
brothers J.B. and J.L. Jones, learned of Hose’s presence and, aware of the
reward, arranged with another farm worker to lure Hose to a party where he was
apprehended. 47 The farm owner tried to disguise Hose prior to going on a train
so that he could be delivered over to law enforcement officials as the terms of
the reward required. 48 En route, a passenger recognized Hose. 49 At a particular
stop, sheriffs from two counties were waiting. 50 They, the Joneses and railroad
company representatives, decided that a special train would be used for the
remainder of Hose’s journey. 51 One hundred and fifty unofficial, armed escorts
went on that special train. 52 When the train arrived at Newman, dozens more
men were waiting. 53 Sheriff Joseph Brown of Newman and the Joneses were
worried about the mob and agreed that they would escort him to the jail, at which
point the Joneses would collect the award, and then Hose would be subsequently
turned over to the lynch mob. 54 However, as he was being marched to the prison,
the mob turned on the sheriff, pointing a pistol at the sheriff and demanding that
Hose be turned over to them at that point. 55 The march to the final destination
where the lynching eventually would take place took time, during which period
trains arrived carrying spectators who had come after Sunday mass to witness
the lynching. 56 All told, 4000 spectators were present to participate in or witness
Hose’s unspeakably brutal death. 57
As this case makes clear, it was not simply a matter of lack of will on the
part of government officials to enforce legal protections to which black men like
Hose were entitled. Citizens can render futile the actions of government officials
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

DRAY, supra note 39, at 8.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
DRAY, supra note 39, at 10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
DRAY, supra note 39, at 10.
Id.
Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 14.
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in defense of the rule of law, and the case of Hose makes clear the ways in which
this was so.
To blame citizens for murder alone in cases like Hose or, taking another
case, suggest they were blameless for the failure to make substantive progress
on legal enforcement of school desegregation is to offer an incomplete
characterization of these cases. Among the 4000 witnesses to Sam Hose’s death
were individuals directly responsible for his killing, and many more bystanders
to his death. 58 But this characterization misses the political character and
purpose of his death. Hose’s death, and the role of citizens in it, was wrong not
just because a human life was extinguished in a brutal manner, though it was
wrong for this reason. It was wrong also because it was the demonstration on the
part of thousands of citizens of a lack of willingness to restrain themselves in
the way that law demands when faced with an alleged rape of a white woman
and killing of a white man by a black suspect. It was wrong because of the
manner in which the actions of the sheriff were rendered futile. These actions
also undermined the ability of law to meaningfully govern conduct in fact. This
was not an ordinary criminal murder; it was political in its purpose and impacted
the possibility of respect for law by officials.
Law is a social practice. Law depends on cooperative action and interaction
between citizens and officials, as well as among officials. Citizens may certainly
guard against the implementation of unjust rules, as Gowder rightly notes, 59 but
through their actions they can also impede the enforcement of rules worthy of
protection. Citizens may render futile the rule of law-oriented activities of law
enforcement officers through their refusal to comply with the restrictions and
limitations law places upon the conduct of citizens. Such actions are rightly
deserving of critique from the perspective of the rule of law; however, Gowder’s
account does not enable us to criticize such actions as inimical to the rule of law.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that we have reason to question two assumptions underpinning
Gowder’s analysis of the rule of law. My critical comments should not, however,
overshadow the remarkable achievement this book represents. Gowder’s
seamless weaving together of conceptual, historical, and empirical examinations
of the rule of law significantly enriches our understanding of how law operates
not just in theory, but also in practice. It sets a new standard for future
interdisciplinary engagements of the rule of law, and definitively shows the
necessity of having such engagements.

58. Id. at 13–14.
59. GOWDER, supra note 1, at 80.
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